




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE




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NSC-U/DM-137C

October 28, 1976

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
The Under Secretary of Transportation
The Special Trade Representative
The Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality
The Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
Policy
The Acting Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Acting Executive Director, Council on
International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Fourth Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The Chairman has forwarded the attached Memorandum
to the President. A copy is provided for your information.


Rutherford M. Poats
Acting Staff Director

Attachment:

As stated

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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NSC-U/DM-137C

October 27, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Fourth Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

This quarterly report is the fourth submitted by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on implementation of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It covers the period May 1 - July 31, 1976, and reports those events related to the CSCE which have taken place since the end of the last reporting period.

A general intensification of interest in CSCE associated with the first anniversary of Helsinki produced a wealth of statements and interpretations of CSCE in both East and West. Actual implementation steps were minimal, but there were some concrete actions and evidence of increased emigration from the USSR.

The first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE at the Helsinki Summit on August 1, 1975 dominated the reporting period. The approach of the anniversary prompted renewed interest in the Conference and its implications in all participant states. This development was accompanied by an intensified effort to interpret the significance of the Final Act and to evaluate developments since the Helsinki gathering.

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The Communist states in particular launched a campaign of media attention and leadership statements aimed at establishing the Helsinki Summit as a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy, and a key watershed in post-war East-West relations, while advancing Communist interpretations of the Final Act and its implementation. Soviet propaganda traced the origins of the CSCE to the Genoa Conference of 1922 and argued that its successful conclusion demonstrated that the foreign policy of the Communist states was now as important as that of the capitalist states in shaping world events. The Communist countries depicted the Final Act as constituting recognition of the post-World War II European geo-political situation and as codification of the ground rules of "peaceful coexistence." While this campaign was largely a continuation of previous efforts, the level of attention devoted to it, as well as its overall scale and intensity, were significantly increased in connection with the Helsinki anniversary.

Western attitudes toward the Helsinki anniversary were considerably more restrained. Statements of Western leaders attributed much less importance to Helsinki and gave special attention to its provisions on the freer movement of people and ideas. They invariably indicated that judgment of the CSCE's place in history would depend on the extent to which its provisions are carried out. Western evaluation of implementation to date was also reserved, with political leaders suggesting that, although some useful steps had been made on a few Basket III issues, further progress would be required if the results of the Conference are to be judged positively.

Western media echoed the same reserve and skepticism. Although many Western journalists recognized the potential value of the Helsinki enterprise as a tool for moving the Communist states toward more liberal practices in the human rights and information fields, they generally evaluated Soviet and Eastern European implementation thus far as minimal. They also expressed reservations as to the Communists' intentions to carry out what Western governments believe to be their commitments under the Final Act.

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The anniversary was also seen by most observers, East and West, as the mid-point between Helsinki and the Belgrade review meetings set to begin with a preparatory session in June, 1977. Political leaders and the press in all countries recognized the potential importance of the Belgrade meetings in terms of encouraging implementation of the Final Act's provisions and as a barometer of East-West relations in the coming period.

Another major indicator of developing attitudes toward Helsinki which occurred during the reporting period was the European Communist Parties' Conference (ECPC), held in Berlin, June 29-30. The treatment of CSCE subjects by the final document of this conference added a major new element to the Communist effort to interpret the results of the CSCE to suit Communist ideology and policy objectives. The document also established a formal relationship between the CSCE Final Act and relations among Communist parties, by which non-ruling European Communist parties joined in pledging themselves to support the Final Act. Speeches by Communist leaders at the Berlin Conference paid considerable attention to the CSCE and its implications. They generally accorded the CSCE high importance as a turning point in East-West relations, but were highly defensive regarding implementation and carried the process of reinterpretation of the Final Act to its highest level thus far. Brezhnev's speech was particularly defensive with regard to Soviet implementation, and sharply attacked Western countries, especially the US, for their alleged failure to implement the Final Act. Brezhnev's review of CSCE was remarkable for its detail and intensity.

Despite the increased rhetorical and media attention to CSCE and its implementation, concrete Soviet and Eastern European implementation steps all but dried up during the reporting period. Our Embassy in Moscow speculated that the Soviets may be saving whatever further implementation measures they may be prepared to adopt for the period immediately preceding the Belgrade meetings, when they will have maximum impact and will help to defuse the recriminations the Soviets evidently fear.

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The Soviets also adopted a sharper, more polemical tone in our discussions with them on implementation, paralleling the tone of Soviet propaganda and leadership statements. Our response to this attitude was to point out privately to the Soviets that we have sought a constructive dialogue with them, not a counter-productive debate, and that their adoption of a polemical attitude will not help us achieve the full implementation the Soviets say they seek and intend.

The Soviets went even further in protesting the creation of the joint Legislative-Executive Commission on CSCE. In a "non-paper" handed to Assistant Secretary Hartman by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on June 17, the Soviets claimed that the Commission's focus on Basket III violated the Helsinki understanding that all parts of the Final Act are equal, and that the Commission's intention to monitor implementation by the USSR constituted interference in internal Soviet affairs. The Soviet media has bitterly attacked the Commission on these grounds and it is clear that the Soviets are particularly sensitive to its creation. One indication of their concern was the question of a Soviet diplomat in Washington who asked a State Department official whether the Commission would invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn to testify.

There were, nevertheless, some concrete implementation steps during the reporting period. The Soviets gave their second notification of a major military maneuver (already reported in the last quarterly report), held near Leningrad, June 14-18. They invited observers from five countries, including NATO member Norway, to attend these maneuvers. In late July they announced that journalists in the USSR could apply for interviews directly to officials of Soviet ministries, rather than through the Foreign Ministry's press office, as previously required. Our Embassy in Moscow is observing how this measure will be carried out in practice in order to evaluate its real significance. Emigration of Soviets with exit visas for the US (almost all for the purpose of family reunification) is currently running at twice

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last year's rate. The FRG has released figures indicating that the number of ethnic Germans permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union and Poland to the FRG since Helsinki has increased significantly. The flow of Soviet Jews leaving with exit visas for Israel is also up slightly this year, but the monthly rate has recently declined a bit. It remains to be seen whether this is a seasonal slump or the beginning of a downward trend.

While not occurring during the reporting period, Ambassador Stoessel presented the Soviets with our 18th representation list on August 5, stressing its relationship to commitments undertaken by the Soviets under the family reunification provisions of the CSCE Final Act. The new list had been rigorously authenticated and totaled 112 families (312 individuals). Our last list, presented a year ago, included 249 families (641 individuals). Since that time, 35 family cases (95 individuals) had been resolved and 100 family cases (229 individuals) for various reasons have been withdrawn from the list--most of these had already emigrated, were planning visits rather than emigration, or had dropped their efforts to leave.

The Soviet dissident group, headed by Yuriy Orlov, which is monitoring Soviet implementation of CSCE, issued a statement on the Helsinki anniversary which concluded that the Soviet authorities do not intend to fulfill their human rights obligations under the Final Act but that the Final Act is, nevertheless, a useful tool for pressing them toward better performance on human rights.

One year after Helsinki, and ten months prior to the joint review of its results in Belgrade, there has been a general intensification of interest in the CSCE. Most Western countries, like ourselves, took the position at the Helsinki Summit that they expect meaningful implementation. Like the US, they have continued to stress the need for implementation, both in connection with the Helsinki anniversary and as the essential foundation for a successful Belgrade meeting. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies, sensitive to Western interest

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in the freer movement concepts of Basket III, have become increasingly defensive of their own practices and critical of what they see as Western implementation shortcomings.

The juxtaposition of these attitudes has produced the central problem of the CSCE's implementation phase: Western governments must respond to skeptical public opinion, as well as press and parliamentary criticism, on CSCE. The essential element in this response must be implementation by the Soviets and the Eastern European states of the CSCE's freer movement provisions. At the same time, it is these provisions that the Communist governments find most difficult to carry out. Yet the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans have a clear interest in making the CSCE a success. They want Belgrade '77 to be a "positive" meeting. But whether it is "positive" to the West depends on the extent to which the Communists themselves put "freer movement" into practice.



Charles W. Robinson
Chairman

Attachment:

CSCE Report

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